and seldom produce robust implications. However, recent work on imperfect competition and taxation makes the surprising claim that the presence of imperfect competition strengthens the case against capital income taxation.
In fact, the optimal tax on capital may well be negative in an imperfectly competitive economy! Even if a fully optimal tax policy is impractical to implement, imperfect competition considerations substantially strengthen the case for moving away from income taxation and towards consumption taxation. This paper reviews the basic ideas which lead to these conclusions.
I. Dynamic Distortions from Factor Income Taxation
Factor income taxation in dynamic models is a special case of commodity taxation and applying basic ideas from commodity tax theory shows why capital income should not be taxed in the long run. We take the Arrow-Debreu approach to intertemporal general equilibrium by viewing consumption and leisure at different dates as different goods. With this view, we can examine the pattern of distortions across consumption and leisure at various dates caused by income taxation. For example, if we save some money at time 0 for consumption at time t, then a tax on investment income between time 0 and t essentially taxes consumption at time t. Suppose r is the before-tax interest rate, τ K the interest tax rate, τ L the wage tax rate, and τ c the consumption tax rate. The social cost of one unit of consumption at time t in units of the time 0 good is (1 + r) −t and the after-tax price is (1 + (1 − τ K )r) −t . This implies that MRS(c 0 , c t ), the marginal rate of substitution between time 0 consumption and time t consumption, is different from MRT (c 0 , c t ), the corresponding marginal rate of transformation. Their ratio expresses the tax distortion and equals
This distortion is the same as if the only tax were a consumption tax at time
Equation (2) shows that the commodity tax equivalent is exploding exponentially in time! Neither wage nor consumption taxation contributes to the disortion in (1). Labor and consumption taxation affect the distortion between time s consumption and time t leisure, which is
Equation (3) shows that the consumption-leisure distortions also grow over time, but only because of asset income taxation, not because of wage or consumption taxation.
These exploding distortions violate the prescriptions of commodity tax theory (see, e.g., Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz, 1972) unless the related elasticities of demand for consumption and leisure fall at a similar exponential rate, a hypothesis lacking empirical support. Since these exploding distortions are due only to capital income taxation, we can eliminate them by setting τ K equal to zero in the long run. This simple intuition lies behind the various results arguing for zero long-run taxation of capital; see Judd (1985 Judd ( , 1999 for formal statements and analyses. This analysis of factor tax distortions also gives us the intuition for understanding taxation in an imperfectly competitive world.
II. Empirical Evidence on Imperfect Competition
The empirical liteature shows that markups are economically signiÞcant and similar in magnitude to tax rates. For example, Elie Appelbaum (1982) estimates price-cost margins of around 20% for many capital goods. Ian Domowitz, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen. (1988) Þnd that price-cost margins in the equipment sectors are substantial in size, lying generally between 15% and 40%. These are signiÞcant deviations of price over marginal cost for our purposes since even a 10% markup on a capital good is equivalent to a 10% income tax on its return.
We do not need to rely only on empirical estimates of price-cost margins for evidence of imperfect competition. Fixed costs for many capital goods are large. For example, R&D expenditures equalled 9.2% of sales for machinery and 4.7% for electrical equipment in 1990 (see F. M. Scherer, 1980) . Learning curves also produce increasing returns to scale which act essentially as a Þxed cost. Unless Þrms face long-run decreasing returns to scale, an unlikely condition, these high Þxed costs imply that price must exceed marginal cost. These considerations plus a conservative estimate of other sources of economies of scale and long-run Þxed costs indicate that imperfect competition produces distortions comparable to taxation.
III. Imperfect Competition and Taxation
The distortions due to taxes levied by governments and markups charged by Þrms are similar since both push the buyer's price above the social marginal cost. Suppose a Þrm pays 1 + m for capital that has social cost 1 to produce, and that the marginal product of capital is MP K. If the Þrm's owners pay a tax τ K on the earnings from this investment and require an after-tax return of r then the level of investment is determined by
If m = 0, (4) is the usual cost of capital formula. The situation in (4) is equivalent to the case of a zero markup and τ K equal to τ * K where
The concept of effective total tax in (5) shows how taxation and imperfect competition combine. Labor markets may be imperfectly competitive due to unionization and consumption good markets may also be imperfectly competitive. However, union premia are similar to labor income taxation and markups on consumption goods are similar to consumption taxes, both producing distortions like those in (3).
IV. Optimal Tax Policy
Joan Robinson (1934) noted that markups and taxes were similar and suggested that tax policy could use subsidies to bring buyer price down to social marginal cost. Robinson ultimately rejected this argument since such subsidies would likely increase proÞts and worsen income distribution. Even if we ignore income distribution, there is still a serious problem with using subsidies to neutralize markups. The subsidies would require substantial revenues since few goods (if any) have negative markups. The optimal policy would have to tax some goods sold above marginal cost in order to provide markup-reducing subsidies for other goods.
While it may appear difficult to choose which distortions to reduce and which to increase, we argue that consumption and wage income should be taxed to Þnance subsidies to capital goods produced by imperfectly competitive Þrms, even if all goods are produced in imperfectly competitive markets.
It is intuitively clear how our earlier arguments apply. Since markups on capital goods distort investment just as asset income taxes do, they combine to produce exploding distortions like those displayed in (1) and (3).
While labor markets may also be imperfectly competitive due to unionization, union markups are similar to labor income taxation and do not create exploding distortions between social and private costs. Therefore, the exploding distortions due to markups in the capital market should be reduced with subsidies even if the necessary revenues use taxes which increase the more uniform distortions in labor and consumption distortions. This holds even when all markets suffer from imperfect competition because the exploding distortions in the capital market will eventually overwhelm the uniform distortions elsewhere.
We need a complete general equilibrium model before we can trust these intuitive arguments. Judd (1997) examines a simple model that formally establishes our arguments. It makes a few key assumptions. First, there is a Þxed number of goods, each of which is produced by a monopolistically competitive Þrm. Each differentiated good is consumed and each good is used to create a differentiated capital good used in the production of all goods.
Judd (1997) uses a representative agent model with elastic labor supply. All taxes are distortionary.
The formal result depends on the taxation of pure proÞts and the distortionary cost of taxation. If pure proÞts are taxed at rate τ Π , Judd (1997) shows that the long-run optimal choice for τ K is
where m is the markup of price over marginal cost and MEB is the marginal excess burden of taxation. These subsidies are Þnanced by labor and consumption taxation, as are all other revenue needs.
Some special cases produce the implications of our simple intuition. If MEB = 0 (i.e., the marginal source of revenue is equivalent to a lump-sum tax) then the optimal tax τ opt K = −m is a subsidy that completely neutralizes the monopolistic price distortion. This repeats the Robinson argument, but only for capital goods since taxes on consumption and/or wages must be positive. The optimal tax rate on pure proÞts, τ Π , is 100%, and in that case the optimal policy eliminates the monopolistic price distortion even if MEB These results are intuitive but they differ substantially from the conventional wisdom on taxation and imperfect competition. For example, Alan J.
Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr. (2001, p. 59) in their survey of optimal taxation present the Robinson argument, but assert "other policy instruments (such as antitrust enforcement) are also typically available and may be more cost-effective at correcting the problem." This view of imperfect competition has no support in the industrial organization literature. In particular, there is no evidence that most, or even a substantial part, of pricing above marginal cost is related to violations of antitrust law. Furthermore, the purpose of patent and copyright law is to grant an innovator the ability to charge prices in excess of production costs. If a Þrm is using intellectual property rights in a legal fashion, it is hard to think of any policy instrument other than taxation which could alleviate the distortions due to imperfect competition.
Even Robinson dismissed this approach as impractical. The fully optimal tax policy may be too complex, but it provides guidance about priorities for tax policy. The key tax result in Judd (1997) says that we should subsidize only capital goods and impose taxes on other goods even if they were produced in imperfectly competitive markets. The simple version of Robinson's argument ignores the distinction capital goods and consumption goods.
When we distinguish between investment and consumption we arrive at a more useful and robust case for tax policy intervention in some imperfectly competitive markets.
V. Imperfect Competition and the BeneÞts of Tax Reform
Full implementation of the optimal tax policy may be impractical but these results strengthen the case for limited tax reforms. For example, many writers, such as Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka (1984) The optimal policy would be difficult to carry out given our imprecise knowledge of markups, and we do not advocate any attempt to do so. Our argument for consumption tax reform uses the optimal tax results in a very limited way. Capital market distortions arising from imperfect competition create exploding distortions in intertemporal allocations. If it would be optimal to reduce price-cost margins for capital goods, then it is surely not a good idea to impose capital income taxes which further aggravate distortions in intertemporal allocations.
Even if major reform is not possible, imperfect competition affects our estimation of the beneÞts from marginal changes. Using a competitive model, Judd (1987) showed that the marginal excess burden of capital income taxation was higher than that of wage taxation, and that increases in the ITC could even be revenue enhancing and Pareto improving. The presence of imperfect taxation in factor markets increases the relative beneÞts of reducing capital income taxation even when it requires an increase in consumption and wage taxation. Even modest estimates of price-cost margins substantially increase the likelihood that an ITC increase enhances revenues and welfare for all.
One problem with consumption tax reform is that some older individuals may lose during the transition. Older investors may not live long enough to beneÞt from the efficiency gains and, in the short run, their assets may fall in value since the price of new capital relative to consumption falls. Imperfect competition in product markets blunts these adverse effects. The economic growth effects of consumption tax reform will allow monopolistically competitive Þrms to earn a rent on new sales since price exceeds marginal cost.
This new proÞt ßow will continue until entry of new Þrms eliminates these proÞts. However, the present value of all new rents, current and future, will be immediately capitalized in the market value of the old Þrms, allowing older investors to reap some of the gains from tax reform.
VII. Conclusion
Many economists argue that there are large long-run gains from reducing the tax burden on new investment. These arguments typically assume competitive factor and goods markets. When we consider imperfect competition the case for reducing the tax burden on capital is substantially strengthened since the estimated gains are larger and the range of Pareto-improving policies is greater.
